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Abstract 
 
Wearables are becoming more computationally 
powerful, with increased sensing and control 
capabilities, creating a need for accurate user 
authentication. Greater control and power allow 
wearables to become part of a personal fog system, but 
introduces new attack vectors. An attacker that steals a 
wearable can gain access to stored personal data on 
the wearable. However, the new computational power 
can also be employed to safeguard use through more 
secure authentication. The wearables themselves can 
now perform authentication. In this paper, we use gait 
identification for increased authentication when 
potentially harmful commands are requested. We show 
how the relying on the processing and storage inherent 
in the personal fog allows distributed storage of 
information about the gait of the wearer and the ability 
to fully process this data for user authentication locally 
at the edge. While gait-based authentication has been 
examined before, we show an additional, low-power 
method of verification for wearables. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Wearables are becoming ubiquitous for consumers. 
Smartwatches, wireless headphones, fitness trackers, 
and even medical wearables, such as insulin pumps and 
heart rate monitors, are becoming commonplace in the 
lives of millions of consumers. These devices collect 
significant data about the user. Heart rate, movement, 
location data, activity level, and, in the case of medical 
wearables, private medical data about the user. The 
amount of data collected makes wearables an enticing 
target for attackers.  
While the ubiquity has increased, so too has the 
power and storage of the wearables themselves. 
Devices like the Apple Watch 3 [1] or Samsung Gear 
[19] are both capable of performing major processing 
for apps that can be loaded directly into the internal 
storage of the watch. We also see increased power in 
devices like the Here One [7] that can process audio 
and remove or amplify specific sounds from a user’s 
environment. This shows that wearables, as is the case 
with most technology, are moving towards the point 
where wearables are as capable as our current phones. 
In fact, the Apple Watch has about the same processing 
power as the iPhone 4 [9]. 
With the increase in processing power of the 
wearables, it becomes possible to make the wearables 
be edge nodes in a fog architecture. When combined 
with an additional base station layer, this architecture 
becomes a personal fog [22], in which all fog nodes are 
owned by the user. By using the personal fog, it is 
possible to process the data collected by the wearable’s 
sensors directly on the wearable and make additional 
decisions, either for security or for app functionality. 
The computational load can also be shared by all peer 
fog nodes, rather than only the wearable or only its 
base station.  
Unfortunately, with the increased power, data 
collection, and other functional capabilities of 
wearables, there is a risk that, if the wearable falls into 
the wrong hands, it could allow an attacker to gain 
personal information about the original user. For 
example, Android Smart Lock [10] allows devices that 
have been declared by the user to be trusted to unlock 
the users’ phone. Thus, as long as the trusted wearable 
is within Bluetooth range the phone will be unlocked. 
This accessibility poses a serious security risk. An 
attacker needs only to steal a trusted wearable and the 
phone to gain access to all data stored on the phone.  
The idea behind the Android Smart Lock system is 
to allow the user to have increased privacy without 
compromising convenience. However, especially with 
the trusted devices option, this feature goes too far in 
opening the door for attackers. It would be better for 
the user if there was a method of using their data from 
their wearables to authenticate the user without the 
user needing to perform any major action, but in a way 
that, if an attacker managed to gain access to the 
wearable and base station, they would not be able to 
access the user’s personal data.  
In this paper, we use a user’s gait for authentication 
when attempting to perform tasks that may be harmful 
to the user should an attacker have access to the 
wearable/base station. We choose gait as our 
authentication method because it is unobtrusive for the 
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user (a user does not need to perform any additional 
identification beyond standard use), is easily collected 
with existing wearables and base stations, and has been 
used by other researchers as a method of user 
identification with high accuracy.  We propose the use 
of the personal fog to distributed stored data on each 
fog node to all fog nodes in the system, allowing 
independent verification by each fog node to ensure a 
potentially compromised fog node does not allow an 
attacker to gain access to a user’s personal data. We 
show that Pearson correlation can be used as a low-
computational cost method of authentication and 
confirm that the additional time to verify is negligible 
for the user.  
 
2. Background  
 
Gait-based authentication has been examined by 
other researchers. Boyle et al. [3] used the Euclidean 
norm of accelerometer readings and a k Nearest 
Neighbors algorithm to identify users’ gaits. They were 
fairly accurate, though in some cases they had an 
accuracy of as low as 70%. Sharma et al. [20] used 
image processing techniques to identify walkers with a 
97.5% accuracy. Papavasileiou et al. [18] used “Smart 
Socks” to authenticate users by their gait. They 
achieved perfect recognition, though they were only 
comparing between the two socks. Ho et al. [8] used a 
phones accelerometer to detect user’s gait. They 
combined the data from the x, y, and z axes and used a 
Bayesian classification to identify the user. In most 
cases, they achieved an accuracy of between 69.7 and 
100%.  
Xu et al. [23] used a smartwatch for gait 
authentication. Their method requires significant 
computation to use, as it performs pre-processing and 
focuses on identifying walking, running, and idling for 
its identification. Muaaz and Mayrhofer [14] used 
adapted Gaussian mixture models to identify users 
based on their gait from a cell phone. Their method 
also requires significant computation, as they omit 
unusual walking cycles and estimate the user’s gait 
from the actual data. Their method does allow for 
orientation independent verification, however [15]. 
Cola et al. [5] used a wrist-worn device, simulating a 
smartwatch, for their gait analysis. Their method 
depends on preprocessing, feature extraction, and 
anomaly detection, producing an accuracy between 
97.3 and 99.6%.  
Gait has been used for purposes other than 
identification. Hwang et al. [11] examined gait to 
measure walking quality using an Arduino attached to 
the user’s leg. They were able to fairly accurately 
(between 81.6 and 95.8%) identify different walking 
styles. Xu et al. [24] used gait to generate secret keys 
between wearable devices and their base stations. Their 
method identified the heel strike, which can be 
identified by all wearables on the body, to generate 
secret keys for encryption of Bluetooth traffic. They 
were able to generate keys with an accuracy between 
72.1 and 98.3%. However, eavesdroppers were able to 
generate keys accurately approximately 50% of the 
time, reducing the usefulness of the method.  
The fog, despite it being a relatively recent 
computing architecture, has been used for a large 
number of applications. These applications include 
providing resilience at scale [4], robotics ([6], [12]), 
data analysis [21], and social sensing for limited 
internet connectivity [16]. It is likely the fog could 
target many applications that require additional 
computing resources, making it ideal for mobile and 
Internet of Things applications. 
 
 
3. The Personal Fog  
 
In this section, we describe how wearables can 
interact within the personal fog. In the personal fog 
described in [22], wearable devices have additional 
processing and storage capabilities. This assumption 
reflects the increasing capabilities of devices such as 
the Apple Watch and the Samsung Gear, which both 
contain additional storage space and processing power 
for data collection and housing developer apps. Each 
wearable is treated as a fog node at the edge, taking 
information from the built-in sensors, performing basic 
processing and compression, and forwarding that data 
to their base station, in this case a phone. While not all 
wearables contain this additional processing power, the 
personal fog invokes a trend of increasing processing 
power to the edge in recent years and makes the 
assumption that all wearables will be powerful enough 
to function as a fog node.  
With the expected increased computational power 
of the wearables, it becomes possible for wearables to 
reason about their environment without relying on their 
base station. In a traditional wearable architecture, the 
base station is in complete control of the wearable and, 
if the wearable is capable of controlling the base 
station (as is the case with smart watches being able to 
change/pause music or unlock the phone), the base 
station must relinquish its control to the wearable. 
There is no additional verification performed to ensure 
the wearable is not being used by an attacker to control 
the phone. With the personal fog, and the additional 
computational power on the edge, the wearables can 
make local decisions, based on their sensor data, to 
verify the user. 
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The architecture of the personal fog is depicted in 
Figure 1. Note that the wearables act as a fog node 
connected directly to their sensors. The wearables are 
connected directly to the base station, which can 
communicate directly with the cloud. By making the 
wearables their own fog nodes, it becomes possible to 
maintain the structure of a fog while ensuring that all 
nodes except the cloud are owned by the user, creating 
a true personal fog.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Personal Fog Architecture 
 
We place a common app on each personal fog 
node, i.e. the wearables and the base station. This app 
can process the collected data at the edge wearable in 
the personal fog to determine if the user is in an 
insecure environment, as described in [22]. The base 
station can also perform the data collection and 
determination. The wearable analyzes only its own 
data and compares it against internal rules that assess 
the environmental parameters and determine the 
security status. The base station aggregates data from 
all connected wearables to perform its own 
determination of the current security status. If either 
denote insecure as the status, then the devices react to 
that state until a secure status is verified.  
Imagine a user has a Garmin Smartwatch. This 
watch allows the user to set up the watch to reply to 
text messages, unlock the users phone, and view 
notifications, even if the phone does not show the full 
notification on screen. If an attacker gets access to the 
watch and the base station, the attacker will gain access 
to the user’s phone, even if the user has a strong 
password or fingerprint verification enabled. If the user 
did not set up the watch to be able to unlock their 
phone, the attacker will still be able to read messages 
and reply to texts as the user. Such scenarios can be 
prevented by the additional power granted to wearables 
by the personal fog, allowing the wearable to locally 
process and verify the user based on data collected by 
its own sensors or peer wearables. 
The architecture of the personal fog is not required 
for the wearable to verify with only its own data. 
However, this verification method could be faked by 
an attacker. The attacker needs only to get root access 
to the wearable and force the stored data used for 
verification to be replayed. With the interconnectivity 
of the personal fog, the verification data can be spread 
across all devices, where each device can verify all 
other device data. In this way, authentication is 
performed by all devices and, should the user fail 
authentication, the fog nodes can shift into an insecure 
state to prevent further attacks. 
It should be noted that, for the purposes of this 
paper, we focus only on the interconnectivity between 
the wearables and the base station for authentication. 
While the cloud is capable of informing the base 
station of its state and collecting data from the base 
station, there are existing methods of verification for 
cloud communication [2]. We do not propose the use 
of gait information when communicating with the 
cloud, though this may be implemented in the future. 
For the purposes of this work, the cloud only 
aggregates information about the current security state 
of the user and is responsible for informing the user 
when they enter an insecure state.  
 
4.  Collecting Valid Gait Information  
 
For authentication, we chose to use accelerometer 
data of a user walking to verify using the wearer’s gait. 
Wearables already collect this data, often using the 
accelerometer data to control functions of the device 
(smartwatches that light up when the wrist is flicked, 
the Apple Watch that opens Siri when watch is brought 
up to the users’ mouth). With the additional edge 
power granted as part the personal fog architecture, we 
can perform additional processing and storage of this 
data collected locally by the wearable. The wearable, 
running our personal fog app, can identify when the 
user is walking, collect valid gait information for 
storage and later use, and adapt to potential attacks if 
authentication fails. 
We focus on a user’s gait primarily because it is 
unobtrusive to collect for a user of the personal fog and 
its accuracy in identification. Other biometric options 
are available, including facial recognition, retinal 
patterns, fingerprints, speech recognition, or facial 
thermograms [13], but each requires additional work 
by the user and additional hardware to be implemented 
by device manufacturers. For facial recognition or 
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retinal patterns, cameras must be installed in all 
wearables and base stations and the user must raise 
each device to their face for identification. A similar 
issue exists for fingerprinting and facial thermograms. 
Speech pattern recognition could work, though any 
attacker who has a recording of the users’ voice could 
perform verification and user verification may not be 
possible in noisy environments.  
There are wearables, such as the Nymi band [17], 
that use ECG sensors to verify a user by their 
heartbeat. This sensor could possibly be used as a more 
secure authentication, but a user is required to press 
their finger into the device to perform the ECG 
reading, adding an additional step, and only the single 
device can be used. Until more wearables make use of 
an ECG, as well as find a way to eliminate the 
additional user step, it is infeasible for the average 
consumer to use the device to ensure their information 
is secure. Thus, for use with the personal fog, gait is a 
very feasible option requiring no additional steps for 
verification (save for actual steps when walking) and 
no additional burden on device manufacturers.  
In order to authenticate a user by their gait there 
must be consistent “valid” data collected. This 
collection should be performed by the user when they 
first set up a new device. It is reasonable to assume that 
when a user adds a fog node to their system they are a 
valid user.  
When a user first sets up their device, our app looks 
for accelerometer data that is consistent with walking. 
We specifically look for long stretches of rhythmic 
jumps in the accelerometer data that imply footsteps. 
This examination is done by searching for peaks and 
valleys in the data that are relatively close to each other 
(local maximums and minimums within a small error 
window of about 0.05). We define a valid amount of 
data to be greater than 5000 data points, equivalent to 
20 seconds of walking.  
We then trim this data to the middle 1100 data 
points. This cleaning of the data ensures that the data 
we rely on is not from the very beginning or very end 
of a walk, as in practical tests this data was inconsistent 
with normal walking. This reason is because users 
being studied would walk slightly more irregularly at 
the very beginning or end of their trip, perhaps as a 
result of knowing they were carrying a wearable for 
testing. It may also be due to a user needing to take a 
number of steps to reach a natural stride. We chose to 
store 1100 data points so that we can choose 100 data 
points for end verification with a starting point 
anywhere between the start and the 1000th data point, 
allowing some variation in the start and end points 
during verification. This choice is not needed but adds 
an extra layer of complexity that wearables can use to 
verify. When verifying, fog nodes can choose any 
point within the 1100 datapoints to use for verification, 
provided it meets the requirements for verification, 
which are discussed in Section 6. 
Once consistent data is collected, it is temporarily 
stored. This stored data is then verified as being 
accurate the next time a walk is detected. If verification 
succeeds, the data is distributed to the other fog nodes 
for storage and to be used by the other fog nodes when 
verification is required. Once a confirmed consistent 
walking pattern is stored on other devices, fog nodes 
store only the most recently consistent walking pattern. 
This peer storage method allows a wearable to send the 
most recently collected gait data to be used when 
authentication is required and a user is not walking. It 
is likely to be the case often, as users tend to be 
stationary for longer periods of time than they are 
walking.  
 
5. Distribution of Gait Data 
 
Both wearables and phones, acting as the 
wearables' base station, are constantly collecting 
accelerometer information, and may tell the user to 
move if the user has been stationary for too long. Many 
wearables use their accelerometer data to calculate 
steps or to recognize the orientation of the device. With 
this data, it becomes possible to create a “walking 
profile” of the user.  
Because wearables are worn on the same parts of 
the body (a smartwatch is usually worn on the same 
wrist at all times) and the base station is often stored in 
a consistent location (pocket, external bag), gait 
information from each device will be consistent for 
each user. Thus, there is a reasonable expectation that a 
user will provide consistent gait information across 
their devices when they are walking. While specific 
devices may differ (the base station will have different 
accelerometer readings than a smartwatch, for 
example) the data collected from a single device will 
be consistent with that device.  
When a wearable attempts to perform an action that 
the system or the user has determined to be a potential 
security risk, such as unlocking the users phone or 
sending a reply message, the wearable attempts to 
authenticate with the other nodes in the users personal 
fog. Figure 2 shows the flow of this authentication. 
First, the wearable requests verification from all 
connected nodes in its personal fog. Once the nodes 
have responded that they perform the requested 
verification, the wearable sends its most recently 
collected valid gait data. The fog nodes then verify the 
gait data they receive from the wearable. If the gait 
data is valid, a fog node sends back a “True” value to 
the wearable.  
Page 7224
 
 
Figure 2. Communication Flow for Gait Verification 
 
 The wearable cannot just accept this true value as 
being valid, however. An attacker may attempt to 
fool the device by intercepting the transmissions 
using a man-in-the-middle attack and send back a 
“True” value regardless of the actual verification 
result. To prevent this spoofing, the other fog nodes 
also send their most recent gait data to the wearable. 
The wearable then uses its stored data from those 
devices to validate each device. Once validated, the 
wearable can assume the previous response is correct 
and, if the user has been authenticated, perform the 
action the user attempts. If the response is not 
validated or the wearable receives a “False” value, it 
blocks the action and shifts into an insecure state, 
preventing additional attacks. 
There can be an issue when the wearable is connected 
to a new base station and does not yet have a copy of 
the base station’s gait profile. In this case, if there are 
no other peer wearables available in the personal fog, 
the wearable will assume it is not allowed to perform 
any of the potentially harmful actions that require 
authentication. While this problem means the user 
would be unable to use their device without 
additional authentication methods, it is temporary, 
since the base station will provide the wearable with 
gait data once the user has walked with the new base 
station. 
 
6. Authenticating Gait Data  
 
To authenticate the gait data, we propose a simple 
method based on Pearson Correlation. By correlating 
the data in this way, we reduce the computational 
power needed to perform the verification so that it 
can be performed by a wearable. Other methods, such 
as those described in the background, can be used as 
well. 
For our method, we take the first 1000 datapoints 
and find a series of datapoints from the middle of a 
walking cycle. We select the next 100 datapoints for 
validation. More datapoints could be used, but a 
smaller number allows for more variation in speed of 
walk cycles, as a user may have slowed down or sped 
up within a walk. Minor variation could cause issues 
with the correlation for a larger number of datapoints. 
We then use the 100 datapoints directly following the 
initial peak. This separation allows our method to 
always begin on a peak and makes it significantly 
more likely to begin on a consistent walking cycle. 
We then run a Pearson correlation on the 100 
datapoints.  
One problem with running a pure Pearson correlation 
on gait data is that attackers could correlate with the 
user by virtue of walking “together”. In such a case, a 
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Pearson correlation will show a significant 
correlation (p < 0.01) between the two users because 
both users will have similar, though slightly different, 
peaks and valleys just from the act of walking to 
maintain the same stride. This situation is obviously a 
problem with using Pearson correlation for 
verification. 
To prevent this issue, we look only for data which 
has an r-value above a preset threshold. The r-value 
is used is a value between -1.0 and 1.0 that represents 
how associated two variables are. A value of -1.0 
shows there is a negative relation, while a value of 
1.0 shows they are completely related. A value of 0.0 
represents no relation. Correlation between two 
different gaits is inevitable, but the degree of 
correlation is not. By specifying a threshold that must 
be met to authenticate a user, we can ignore even 
strong correlations that may arise as a result of both 
user’s gaits being correlated based only on both sets 
of walking data. We choose a threshold of 0.70 for 
our tests, though modification by the user is an option 
for increased security.  
 
 
Figure 3. Verification of Gait by Legitimate User 
 
 
Figure 4. Attempted Verification of Gait by 
Attacker 
 
7. Evaluation  
 
To evaluate our system, we conducted a small test 
with 6 attackers and 5 legitimate attempts at 
verification. For each test, users, acting as an 
attacker, were asked to hold a Raspberry Pi, acting as 
a wearable, in their right hand to mimic a 
smartwatch. They then walked approximately 3000 
feet to measure their gait. All attackers walked the 
same route that the verification data was collected on. 
Attackers ranged in height and gait-length, with one 
attacker having the same height and gait-length of the 
legitimate user and the other attackers having a 
smaller height and gait-length. For the verification of 
the original user, our legitimate user walked the 
initial route to collect the verification data. The user 
then walked the same route on a different day and 4 
different routes at different times over the course of a 
week.  
A graphical representation of one legitimate 
verification attempt can be seen in Figure 3 and one 
attacker attempting to verify can be seen in Figure 4. 
The stored gait data is shown in solid lines, while the 
data being verified is shown in dashed lines. 
These graphs are intended to show that, at a 
glance, the gaits are different enough to say they are 
indeed different users. To show that verification 
worked as intended, we then ran a Pearson 
correlation on each of the attackers and legitimate 
user data. Results of verifying the legitimate user can 
be seen in Table 1, while attempted verification of 
the attackers can be seen in Table 2. 
When examining these tables, the methodology 
looked for verification between X values, Y values, 
and Z values, based on the assumption that the 
wearable is held in the same orientation in the same 
hand across tests. This assumption reflects common 
usage since users wear their devices in approximately 
the same area. Thus, when looking for correlations, 
we are only looking at the values starting from an X 
correlation and going diagonally down to the Z 
correlation.  For example, the X values of each walk 
are correlated with the stored X values, the Y values 
are correlated with the stored Y values, and the Z 
values are correlated with the stored Z values. 
Correlating X values with Y or Z values are not 
examined. 
In Table 1, we can see that all additional walks 
correlate strongly with the stored gait data. The 
lowest correlation, Walk5 Z, still correlates at a value 
of r = 0.71 with Stored Z. This gives a p-value of p < 
0.00001. Of note, however, is that any r value greater 
than 0.256 will give us a p-value less than 0.01. We 
expect this result, as any two users walking will have 
a correlation that they are walking. Our methodology 
relies on incredibly high r values to identify a user by 
their gait. Interestingly, the Y and Z values are all 
highly negatively correlated. For example, Walk5 Z 
is negatively correlated with Stored Y at r = -0.71. 
This result could be added into the verification 
process in the future as an additional check to 
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authenticate a user, though more research would be 
needed to confirm it is the case for all users. It is 
possible that it is just a result of the style of gait that 
the legitimate user has.  
Table 2 indicates that none of the attacker’s gaits 
correlate at a level we expect for verification. The 
highest correlation comes from attacker 4, with both 
of their X and Y values correlating at a value r > 0.5, 
and from attacker 6, who had a Y value correlated at 
r = 0.65. These values are lower than the 0.71 
minimum found with a legitimate user and below the 
0.7 valued expected for verification. Interestingly, the 
highest correlations came not from correlating the X, 
Y, and Z values with the users corresponding X, Y, 
and Z values, but with correlations between X, Y, 
and Z values. For example, Attacker 5’s Z value had 
a strong negative correlation (-0.75) with the user’s X 
value.  
It is possible that an attacker can try to mimic the 
user’s gait, especially if the attacker is familiar with 
their target. To examine this scenario, we recruited 
two subjects, one of the same height and leg length as 
the legitimate user and one of a different height and 
leg length, attempting to mimic the user’s gait. Both 
walked directly next to the original user, allowing 
them to ensure their steps matched the user as closely 
as possible. Each attacker attempted to mimic the 
user’s gait twice.  
 
Table 1. Pearson Correlation of Legitimate 
User 
  Stored X Stored Y Stored Z 
Stored X 1   
Stored Y -0.13462 1  
Stored Z 0.20493 -0.85757 1 
Walk1 X 0.921468 -0.06334 0.161636 
Walk1 Y -0.21378 0.919074 -0.90257 
Walk1 Z 0.056176 -0.76916 0.871817 
Walk2 X 0.899738 -0.19281 0.259065 
Walk2 Y -0.12032 0.817692 -0.8325 
Walk2 Z 0.009094 -0.80609 0.897764 
Walk3 X 0.915283 -0.27262 0.330213 
Walk3 Y -0.20816 0.907648 -0.87047 
Walk3 Z 0.132923 -0.85172 0.921374 
Walk4 X 0.812616 0.039542 0.160344 
Walk4 Y -0.24806 0.873684 -0.85932 
Walk4 Z 0.084646 -0.7836 0.83035 
Walk5 X 0.890756 -0.29117 0.418455 
Walk5 Y -0.3287 0.845019 -0.71493 
Walk5 Z 0.200942 -0.71473 0.717343 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation of Attacker 
  Stored X Stored Y Stored Z 
Stored X 1   
Stored Y -0.13462 1  
Stored Z 0.20493 -0.85757 1 
Attacker1 X -0.6623 0.325599 -0.54795 
Attacker1 Y -0.14655 0.474359 -0.33881 
Attacker1 Z 0.462857 -0.52557 0.491506 
Attacker2 X 0.048722 -0.27774 0.071827 
Attacker2 Y 0.314086 -0.42231 0.221583 
Attacker2 Z -0.36024 0.305483 -0.34226 
Attacker3 X -0.12285 -0.58759 0.545348 
Attacker3 Y 0.196888 -0.51463 0.415218 
Attacker3 Z 0.166804 0.4271 -0.49472 
Attacker4 X 0.569107 -0.18589 0.220556 
Attacker4 Y 0.155689 0.552398 -0.32765 
Attacker4 Z -0.13 -0.45604 0.240945 
Attacker5 X -0.65764 0.246436 -0.35979 
Attacker5 Y -0.10304 -0.3374 0.055477 
Attacker5 Z -0.7479 0.502703 -0.43321 
Attacker6 X -0.24377 -0.54304 0.430248 
Attacker6 Y -0.55745 0.649798 -0.71654 
Attacker6 Z -0.17141 0.30546 -0.43277 
 
Table 3 shows the result of the attackers 
attempting to mimic the user’s gait. Mimic 1 and 2 
are the attacker of the same height and leg length and 
Mimic 3 and 4 are the attacker of a different height 
and leg length. Interestingly, the highest correlation 
at r = 0.57 occurred with the attacker of a different 
height and leg length. If we allow the Z direction to 
be correlated with Y, the attacker of the same height 
and leg length has a maximum correlation of r = 
0.62. However, all of these are below the 0.7 value 
set for gait verification of the user. 
We also validate the time it takes to run the 
Pearson correlation and transfer the required data via 
Bluetooth. We ran the Pearson correlation 100 times 
on the wearable security testbed. On average, the 
Pearson Correlation took 0.19 milliseconds to run. 
For the time it takes to send the validation data via 
Bluetooth, we tested sending the data as a batch of 
100 values to two devices. We sent our test data a 
total of 954 times, taking an average of 5.22 
milliseconds. These two results show that the time it 
takes to verify the user is minimal, around 6 
milliseconds on average. This result is fast enough to 
ensure that the use of multiple different devices for 
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verification and storage will not slow the user down 
significantly. It is below the 40ms used by movies to 
simulate smooth motions and, thus, will not be 
noticed by the user. 
 
Table 3. Pearson Correlation of Attacker 
Mimicing User 
  Stored X Stored Y Stored Z 
Stored X 1   
Stored Y -0.1346 1  
Stored Z 0.20493 -0.8576 1 
Mimic1 X -0.1776 -0.3051 0.09857 
Mimic1 Y 0.32715 -0.5582 0.52614 
Mimic1 Z -0.0097 0.64248 -0.5999 
Mimic2 X -0.4989 0.00445 -0.2864 
Mimic2 Y 0.44001 -0.5401 0.49955 
Mimic2 Z 0.03235 0.63008 -0.5612 
Mimic3 X -0.1993 -0.4968 0.32709 
Mimic3 Y 0.08862 -0.5414 0.55538 
Mimic3 Z 0.0272 0.42123 -0.4385 
Mimic4 X 0.57266 -0.3955 0.32645 
Mimic4 Y -0.1889 0.14998 -0.061 
Mimic4 Z -0.0135 0.26993 -0.0707 
 
8. Conclusions and Future Work  
 
In this paper, we extend gait-based verification 
techniques and apply the concept of gait-based 
authentication to the personal fog architecture.  
Within the personal fog, we shift the authentication 
requirements from the local wearable to all connected 
fog nodes. This shift allows verification of multiple 
different gait profiles from different locations on the 
body and prevents an attacker from accessing 
personal information from stolen wearables. With the 
additional power assumed by the personal fog, we 
allow all connected fog nodes to independently verify 
the gait of the user using the recorded gaits of all fog 
nodes. We show this method is viable for wearables 
through testing using our wearable security testbed.  
It is important to note that this method is designed 
to be used in small scale. A user’s gait data will only 
be passed between their devices, never moving to the 
cloud. If this method is implemented on a large scale, 
with gait data being stored not just on a user’s own 
devices but across multiple fog nodes outside of the 
user’s control, the continuous monitoring of the 
user’s data and storage in a database by a user could 
be exploited by an attacker to identify and target 
specific users based on their gait. Ideally, this method 
is used only on the layers of the personal fog that the 
user has control over and, thus, should never exceed 
the number of devices a user can comfortably wear.  
This method has limitations. One issue is that, if 
an attacker is able to access the wearable without 
needing to then walk to a different location, they can 
use the existing stored gait information to 
authenticate and gain access to the users’ private 
information. This outcome would likely not be an 
issue in most cases. However, if a user left their 
device somewhere, an attacker could gain access 
without needing to take the device to another 
location. This would require the user to leave all their 
wearables and their base station in a single location, 
which is unlikely, but more research is needed to 
prevent this possible attack.  
An attacker with unlimited time to study and 
refine a user’s gait may also be able to successfully 
mimic the users gait enough to fool our system. 
While we tried to address this situation with our own 
testers mimicking the stored user’s gait, we did not 
provide our attackers with unlimited time to learn and 
practice the users gait. Further research is needed to 
discover if, given enough time, an attacker could 
mimic a user’s gait enough to fool our system. 
Another issue with this method is that gait data 
could be seen as medically valuable. Gait can be used 
to recognize health issues in a user and having their 
gait information stored on multiple devices could 
allow attackers to gain access to this health 
information or be used to diagnose medical 
conditions the user was not aware of. Should an 
attacker gain access to this information, either 
through accessing the stored data itself or through 
eavesdropping on the gait data as it is being passed 
between devices, they could gain insight into a user’s 
health or psychological state. This problem is made 
worse if the gait data is passed to a third party for 
verification. While we have focused only on using 
gait data for identification in a personal fog, where all 
devices are owned by the user, the fog, by its very 
nature, can have additional nodes outside of the users 
control added in the future. We do not recommend 
using gait for identification in this case, as an attacker 
gaining access to a third-party node would provide 
them with the stored data from all users that use that 
node.  
We would also like to extend this verification 
method to other devices and other methods of 
verification. User data is often unique enough to be 
used for authentication and wearables are constantly 
collecting data about their user. It is possible that our 
method of storing data for verification across 
multiple devices could expand to use more than just 
gait data.  
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